Sometimes a blog entry comes along that just bowls you over. I almost always enjoy Jon Marks’s all-to-infrequent posts but his latest one is really a work of art and now wins my awards for ‘best short explanation of why anthropologists think NAS jumped the shark when it elected Napoleon Chagnon’.
The fire works really start in the second half of the entry, where Marks asks “can we generalize from Napoleon Chagnon’s demonstration that murder and babies are correlated?” He writes:
What would it mean if Yanomamo murderers outbred non-murderers? Well, if you believe that this is a bi-allelic system, then the Yanomamo murderer alleles would quickly swamp out the non-murderer alleles. But of course only a fucking idiot would believe that.
When Brian Ferguson (amongst others) made this point (without cursing) Chagnon said that “it looks as though [Ferguson’s] hypothesis doesn’t hold up”. To which Marks replies:
No, Chagnon is the one with a hypothesis, and his data are statistically inadequate to either confirm or deny it. Moreover, when Nicholas Wade writes, “Dr. Chagnon said he was familiar with those criticisms but called them invalid and said none had been published in a peer-reviewed journal” he puts an unchallenged falsehood in Chagnon’s mouth in support of this poor scientific reasoning… In science, if you make a claim, you have to demonstrate its validity and do the proper controls. Or else shut up. Really. That’s not an extravagant demand; it is an expectation.
Emphasis is in the original there folks.
Regarding the second issue in the Yanomami debate, “was Chagnon’s work rejected out of an anti-science ideological bias in anthropology?” Marks responds:
Are you fucking kidding me? Say that out loud and hear how stupid it sounds…The AAA voted not to strip the word “science” from its long range plan. Yes, it was suggested (to emphasize the breadth of the scope of anthropology beyond the boundaries of science and encompassing the humanities as well); yes, it was put to a vote (because there was some feeling that it was a bad idea); and yes, it was voted down.
Marks nails it right on the head when he writes:
It’s not that the opposition is against Darwinism; it’s that Darwinism is compatible with many understandings of human social behavior, including normative anthropology. Nicholas Wade scowls at Marshall Sahlins, who recently resigned from the National Academy of Sciences partly over Chagnon’s election, by explaining that Sahlins opposes sociobiology, which Wade defines as “the idea that human social behavior is shaped by evolution and culture.” Actually… that’s not sociobiology, that’s anthropology!
It’s not that anthropology is against evolution, it’s that anthropology is against the perversion of evolution in support of idiosyncratic social theories, which recurs every generation.
Science, evolution, and anthropology are all on the same side. The other side is where the anti-intellectuals and ideologues are, and have always been, the ones who either don’t understand evolution themselves, or are knowingly misrepresenting its implications to the public.
Couldn’t agree with you more, Rex. I wish Jon blogged more when he writes pieces like this. And I really appreciate his perspective because I feel that, too often, cultural anthropologists actually take on board the assertions about ‘science’ made by people like Wade and Chagnon. In the end, they wind up arguing against ‘science,’ which sort of positions us alongside climate deniers, Creationists, vaccine resisters, and bogus ‘think tanks’ with corporate backing.
Jon makes so many points well, but I just would redouble his emphasis that SCIENCE is on the side of anthropology. So often, we’re actually making empirically-based claims about humanity against ideologues and researchers who are studying only a very narrow slice of humanity, who are also making arguments about ‘human nature’ that are not even compatible with serious evolutionary theory. A lot of the people flying the banner of ‘sociobiology’ and ‘evolutionary psychology’ are, in my opinion, making claims that are fundamentally flawed even from the perspective of Darwinist theory, let alone from the empirical evidence of human diversity in ethnology.
I feel like we too easily let them get away with claiming that their theories are ‘evolutionary’ and that opposition is ‘anti-Darwinist.’ Jon’s great to point out that, no, these theories that stress universal human nature, innate cognitive functions, etc. are simply not Darwinist, let alone in step with recent decades of evolutionary theory.
Bravo!
Brilliant piece, really skewers Chagnon’s attempts at explanation.
On an intellectual level, I am more in alignment with Marks than Chagnon when it comes to philosophy of science. Indeed, I’m a big admirer of Marks’ book “What it Means to be 98% Chimpanzee”.
But I could do without Marks’ bombast as quoted in this posting, or for that matter in the title of Chagnon’s recent book. Such excesses are great for preaching to the choir. But for the unpersuaded, charm usually is more persuasive than name-calling and profanity.
“It’s not that anthropology is against evolution, it’s that anthropology is against the perversion of evolution in support of idiosyncratic social theories, which recurs every generation.”
^^That nails it right there.
Sorry, but I for one am not “bowled over” by Marks’s post. For one thing his choice of language immediately identifies him as an ideologue with a grudge rather than a serious scientist finding legitimate flaws in someone’s research. I have nothing against colorful expressions, but if his point is to impress us with his seriousness, then the “f” word was not a very good choice. The general tone of irate indignation that pervades all his writing on this topic is a perfect example of why so many feel this to be an ideological rather than a truly scientific dispute.
Real scientists get things wrong all the time. That doesn’t make them monsters to be shunned. And as far as “objectifying” other humans is concerned, sorry, but that is precisely what anthropologists do all the time. No time to get into some of the more interesting aspects of his post now, but that’s not all I’d like to say about this extremely UNconvincing “argument.”
Two research projects I’ve been thinking of that need funding.
One entails hiring attractive young men who over a period of time, would make themselves known to congressmen who’ve supported DOMA. The introduction would be slow, over a period of months or up to a year, and the expenses wouldn’t be insignificant but I think it would be worth it. The other would be a similar investigation of the wives of male academic proponents of libertarianism. Both projects undertaken of course wholly as a matter of science. No question of any interest in politics.
OK, I’m back. Before continuing I want to make it clear that I am not a sociobiologist, nor am I particularly sympathetic to the “selfish gene” hypothesis. Pinker’s theories on violence, based on questionable research by Wrangham and Peterson, are vigorously contested in Chapter Six of my book, Sounding the Depths, and similarly Hobbesian theories proposed by Nicholas Wade and Francis Fukuyama regarding the cultural and genetic inheritance of “early man” are imo soundly refuted in Chapter Eighteen.
Nor am I an uncritical admirer of Napoleon Chagnon. Far from it. To my horror, I recently discovered an analysis of his film, “The Ax Fight,” by Chagnon and Paul Bugos, in which they present a theory of “selfish gene” type behavior on the part of the Yanoama that reveals what looks to me like an astonishing degree of naïveté regarding the mechanisms of natural selection (see http://www.anth.ucsb.edu/projects/axfight/updates/chagnonandbugos.html#Conclusion). Noting the strong tendency of kinsmen to support one another in this fight, the authors come to the very odd conclusion that such behavior is largely determined by genetic rather than cultural considerations, based on the “kin selection” hypothesis, which predicts that one will altruistically aid others to the degree that they carry the same or similar genes. Of course, the much simpler explanation, based on family loyalty, is completely ignored, so evidence that kinsmen support one another is seen as evidence of “kin selection” at work — the implication being that individuals somehow sense that the survival of close biological kin will enhance the “fitness” of their own genes.
As I see it, this is sheer balderdash, literally reversing the cause and effect mechanisms of natural selection. By arguing that the outcomes of natural selection are preceded by behaviors designed to produce them is in fact dangerously close to intelligent design.
So anyone wanting to trash Chagnon’s scientific credibility need look no farther than this truly amazing piece of pseuo-science.
NEVERTHELESS.
Chagnon’s theory regarding the possibility that the causes of violence could be genetic as well as cultural, or even primarily genetic, are another matter entirely. More presently.
@docG–I’m looking forward to your continuation of this post. Particularly this point:
“…literally reversing the cause and effect mechanisms of natural selection. By arguing that the outcomes of natural selection are preceded by behaviors designed to produce them is in fact dangerously close to intelligent design…NEVERTHELESS.
Chagnon’s theory regarding the possibility that the causes of violence could be genetic as well as cultural, or even primarily genetic, are another matter entirely.”
Aren’t you twisting yourself in a knot?
Marks’ point that Chagnon failed to address his critics is true and well-supported, and for that alone the post would be worthwhile. Look past the language. Just because someone says ‘fuck’ and ‘shit’ doesn’t mean that they’re incapable of insight or that they are not serious.
I can’t share in this view. All primates appear to differentially support and interact with their kin. The mechanism appears to be residence and contact during childhood rather than a mystical sense for kin connections, and humans have the capacity to reinforce this understanding of kin relationships with language, but that doesn’t invalidate Chagnon’s interpretation per se, because residence and kinship very often overlap (not necessarily, of course – but if you took residence as a guideline to shared genes, you wouldn’t go far wrong, which seems to be how the trait evolved).
I wouldn’t endorse the entirety of Chagnon’s explanation – which amounts to the view that there is no, or very little, cultural or historical impact on behaviour during a fight, something clearly ridiculous – but there certainly is some role played by natural selection in producing human traits like differential support for kin and altruism, and such traits are played out in just such life-and-death scenarios.
Al, natural selection is something that happens after the fact, not prior to it. Any theory that argues otherwise is, in effect, a version of intelligent design. Yes, there certainly may be “some role played by natural selection in producing human traits like differential support for kin and altruism,” but to argue that “such traits are played out in just such life-and-death scenarios” is to confuse cause with effect. The problem, as I see it, has to do with the very confusing and misleading terminology so often used by evolutionists, including Darwin.
There is no creature that ever actually “selects” for anything, or “adapts” to anything, not biologically at least, and certainly nature in general performs no such acts. So when your typical evolutionist “explains,” say, the tendency of a certain insect to “mimic” its surroundings as an “adaptation” we must be very careful not to take this well worn terminology literally. Obviously what happens is that a certain mutation produces a gene or genes that happen, by sheer chance, to produce an effect that’s favorable to the creature’s survival. And in certain cases, over time, that effect can lead to the development of a new species that appears remarkably well “adapted” to its surroundings. The notion that the creature, or even the population, somehow “adapted” to its environment is purely an illusion — an illusion, moreover, closely akin to the illusion of intelligent design.
More or less the same dynamic could be applicable to kin support (though I doubt whether that’s been established). But the outcomes of natural selection, which are produced only after significant lengths of time, and measurable only through the use of statistical analysis, can never be used to explain the behavior of individuals as though these individuals are somehow anticipating the results of a “selection” process that will only manifest itself at some time far in the future. Their behavior may in some sense be explainable as the result of “natural selection,” but NOT their motivation to produce that behavior, which is what is implied by Chagnon’s essay — and also by the very misleading phrase “the selfish gene.” As though genes were capable of anticipating the results of their activity and acting accordingly. Evolution doesn’t work that way. The “selfish gene” is just another name for intelligent design.
@Tony Waters: “Aren’t you twisting yourself in a knot?”
Not at all. Look, even some of the greatest scientists were spectacularly wrong about certain things. Galileo ridiculed the idea that the moon had anything to do with the tides. Newton spent an inordinate amount of time experimenting with alchemy. Kepler’s initial model of the solar system was a mistake, as he ultimately realized. Bohr’s early model of atomic structure was wrong. Etc. etc.
I’m not comparing Chagnon to any of these giants, but I do happen to think that his theories regarding the biological origins of violent behavior, while certainly not established, do seem reasonable and worthy of continued study. This is not something I advocate, or even consider, in my book, which is focused on what population genetics (and music) can tell us about the survival of certain traditions, and has nothing to say about Darwinian evolution. But certain of my findings could have a bearing on such issues. For example, here’s an excerpt from Chapter Ten, regarding the possible aftermath of a major natural disaster:
“Instead of an egalitarian ethic, steeped in non-violence, a new system of values, based on the survival of the strongest, most assertive and most competitive individuals, and their subservient followers, could emerge. Once such a tradition is established, it would be almost impossible to go back to the old way of doing things and even of thinking. Even if things might improve over time, to the point that the society is no longer stressed, and no longer dependent on strong, aggressive leaders, it might not matter, because traditions tend to perpetuate themselves long after they have lost their original purpose and even their meaning.”
Since my focus was on tradition and not biology, I never considered the Darwinian implications of the above statement. But they are certainly there. Under the circumstances described above, we see a situation where individuals genetically predisposed toward aggressive and even violent behavior would be more likely to survive, and pass on their genes, than less aggressive individuals who might not be able to compete. So in addition to the establishment of new values supporting aggressive and even warlike traditions, we might also see the establishment of a newly dominant genetic line reinforcing the same value system biologically.
I certainly do NOT subscribe to Chagnon’s assumption that violence is encoded in our genes primordially — in fact my book presents an argument for exactly the opposite view. But I cannot deny that in the case of the Yanoama, along with many other groups thought to have been traditionally committed to institutionalized violence of one sort or another, such behavior might well have a genetic component in addition to the very clear cultural component. Which is NOT to say that individual members of such groups act violently in order to enhance the likeliness of passing on their genes, as Chagnon appears to believe, which is seeing the dynamic back asswards.
As to whether research along such lines somehow “objectifies” these societies, or can be used to justify their mistreatment, I’m sorry, but if we took such concerns seriously then we soon find ourselves living in a puritanical police state, where every word anyone uttered was monitored for possible harmful effects. Every day we see people being “objectified” and even vilified on the Internet, and all sorts of potentially harmful consequences for all sorts of individuals and populations are certainly possible as a result. That is the price we pay for the sort of open society we tend to encourage, and I don’t see any reason why anthropological research should be an exception.
I’m quite sure you don’t understand the theory. It does not say that the genes know what will happen, only that genes play a role in determining behaviours and that it is a part of human phylogenetic inheritance to favour close kin over others. The axe fight was an exemplar of this trend.
Al, I realize that the theory does not say outright that genes know what will happen, but that in fact is what appears to be implied in much of the thinking behind sociobiology. What I’m saying is that sociobiologists don’t seem to have thought very deeply about the implications of their theory. If it does NOT imply that genes somehow can predict what will happen, then as far as I can determine, sociobiology is no different from traditional evolutionary theory. But I’m not an expert on this so perhaps you can enlighten me regarding that difference.
This is essentially the same problem I see with Chagnon’s interpretation of the ax fight. If it’s simply matter of arguing that kin support is, at least in part, produced by natural selection, I have no problem with that, and as far as I can tell, that would seem perfectly in tune with traditional evolutionary thinking.
Altruistic behavior on the part of kinsmen can indeed lead to the “success” of certain genes associated with such behavior, but only if the word “success” is kept strictly in quotes. It’s absurd to think the genes actually “succeed” in propagating themselves. It’s just that certain types of behavior might produce just that sort of effect, as though they were “succeeding.” It’s equally absurd to argue that Yanoama tribesmen or any other individuals are in any way shape manner or form motivated genetically when supporting kinsmen in a fight. And if they are not so motivated, then sorry but I don’t get it. What’s his point?
Also what is the point of using this ax fight as a test of “kin selection” when the behavior of the participants can far more easily and simply be explained as simple loyalty, based on traditionally understood kinship ties.
A much better test would be something like the following:
A group of close friends, who’ve known each other since childhood, but are not genetically related, are confronted by a group of brothers, and challenged to a fight. Unknown to one of these friends, he happens to be their long lost brother, who was adopted in infancy. Now. If he decides to fight alongside the brothers who share so many of his genes, against the friends who share none, then I would see that as evidence supporting the sociobiological notion of “kin selection.” I’ll let you decide which behavior is more likely, but, hey, you never know if a hypothesis is going to pan out until you test it.
If there is something you think I’ve misunderstood then by all means explain. Because I must admit I’m extremely puzzled by what Chagnon and his colleague have to say regarding “kin selection” and its relation to this ax fight.
No, sociobiology is not different from evolutionary theory. It is just an extension of it into animal psychology. What dispositions should we expect, given evolution by natural selection?
Successful genes will propagate themselves and unsuccessful genes will not. That is how evolutionary success is defined. It is also a tautology; successful genes will propagate themselves, unsuccessful genes will not, and the definition of success is propagation. Clearly this is a blind process and requires no thought by the genes themselves. This is just how evolution by natural selection works.
It is not a successful evolutionary strategy to have sex with your immediate family, because that produces deleterious effects in offspring, especially if conducted generation after generation. It is therefore unlikely that a species that conducted such activities would prosper and propagate itself widely, and any genes that created this tendency would fail. Therefore, we should expect a genetic predisposition to incest avoidance.
And, given that genes, or close variants, are shared by members of kin groups, it is more likely that genes will propagate themselves if the individuals in which they reside protect one another. We should expect that individuals who are more closely related should be more likely to protect one another.
How do individual humans know that they are related to one another? Study after study has shown that they do this by inferring it from residence in childhood. This means that incest avoidance and preferential protection of one another is based on both instinct and experience in combination. Humans are born with instincts to avoid sex with co-residents, and this category very often – often enough that it affects fitness – overlaps with categories of people who share a bulk of genetic material. This means that, without any forethought or guidance or intelligence on the part of individual genes, humans have a number of genetic predispositions for certain actions.
The point of using the axe fight as an example of kin selection is to show that whatever the cultural background, it appears that humans preferentially support their kin (with, as we should expect, some cultural input in the form of fictive kinship and variation due to co-residence in childhood). The point was to demonstrate that this is a phylogenetic phenomenon, impacted by culture but firmly a part of human genetic material for a number of identifiable and sensible reasons.
This is evidence that you do not understand the mechanism. The mechanism is co-residence in childhood, not some mystical genetic connection that individuals are somehow aware of. Here is why the model works even despite these exceptions: co-residence in childhood very, very often overlaps with shared genetic material. The exceptions are much rarer. This is sufficient to affect fitness.
It’s not even remotely absurd. Why do Yanomami (I’m not sure where you’re getting the transliteration Yanoama from; it doesn’t appear to be a standard anywhere) people protect their siblings, cousins, parents, etc? Well, partly because they are told to do so, but also because of their phylogenetic inheritance as human beings. The genetic inheritance has primacy in determining the phenomenon and is cross-culturally applicable. This is important.
@Al
From Chagnon’s Ax Fight analysis:
“Individuals, in maximizing their inclusive fitness, should be expected to favor other individuals who are genetically related to them, i.e., who are ultimately in a position to contribute the altruist’s genes to succeeding generations.”
OK, already I see a problem, because the great majority of humans, and certainly Yanoama, have no way of knowing who is genetically related to them or not. Chagnon’s difficulties in assembling genealogies attests to that. And sorry but it’s not enough to insist that the usual sort of kinship ties are a reasonably adequate index of genetic relatedness, because the theory is based on genetics, which is biologically determined, and NOT the usual sort of kinship ties, which are culturally determined. In fact, the theory is based on the distinction between the cultural and biological realms. Unless you can find a way to distinguish between the two, then there is no way to meaningfully test your hypothesis. Which was the point of my little “thought experiment.”
More Chagnon:
“If the potential costs (in fitness units) to the altruist are the same should he/she favor (1) a close relative, (2) a distant relative, or (3) a non-relative, then one should expect the altruist to “invest” in that individual who, by receiving the benefit, is most likely to yield an equivalent or greater fitness benefit to the original altruist. An analogy with banking and interest rates might be useful to illustrate the principle. . .”
The language here makes it extremely difficult to assess the nature of the claim being made. The analogy to banking implies that the “altruist” cares whether or not his “investment” is going to pay off, but in the case of the ax fight or anything similar, it should be clear that none of the actors could care less about the genetic “benefit” in question. So in what sense can it be regarded as a benefit? Who actually benefits? Some genes? Sorry, but I’ve never heard of a gene capable of caring about anything, least of all an investment.
Yes, it may well be true that the genes of those who support their own biological kin have a greater chance of being propagated to future generations. But that has nothing to do with what motivates individuals during a conflict. So what bearing can it possibly have on Chagnon’s ax fight? It is only in retrospect that the biological meaning of the conflict can be assessed, i.e., only after the next generation of children are born. So what are we talking about here, time travel?
Now Chagnon does in fact attempt to account for the problems I’ve just identified:
“It is not necessary, in testing kin selection hypotheses, to assume that the individual actors in any social situation are cognizant of “fitness” or are capable of “calculating” coefficients of genealogical relatedness. Natural selection favors organisms that behave adaptively, whether or not they are aware of the evolutionary consequences of their behavior.”
Interesting what he does here. It’s not necessary to assume that individuals are aware of “fitness” but it IS necessary to accept that something called “natural selection” has such an awareness. So the awareness gets transferred from clueless humans to an all knowing “natural selection” which “favors” certain organisms in certain ways. Sorry, but I for one fail to appreciate such a “favor.” And yes, I do understand Chagnon’s point, but it should also be clear that the use of such metaphoric language can be extremely misleading. I think it’s led Chagnon astray.
In any case, what we are talking about in the ax fight is NOT natural selection, or fitness, but motivation. And I see no reason to conclude that the participants in this fight are motivated by considerations pertaining to fitness. Unless, maybe they are showing off for the benefit of the ladies in the village, but Chagnon has nothing to say about that aspect.
The fact remains that a far simpler explanation for the choice of allies is available, and that is the usual anthropological explanation, based on kinship ties as understood culturally. Nothing in Chagnon’s “experiment” addresses the crucial difference between culture and biology, and so as I see it, the experiment is pointless.
I must add that the film itself and all the supplementary material pertaining to it is something I find extraordinarily interesting and valuable in its own right. It’s only when the authors attempt to turn it into some sort of lesson in sociobiology that I have a problem.
Yes, you’re right. It’s about motivation. And where does that motivation come from? The motivation to assist people who are closely related to you comes from your phylogenetic heritage. I’m amazed that you find this so troublesome. Even if you find Chagnon’s arguments themselves incorrect, you should appreciate that the axe fight has been used by other researchers who have access to the original footage as well, including Bernard Chapais, and the precise arguments he makes are irrelevant. I have to say, you really don’t seem to understand the point, nor the mechanism.
What makes people want to fight for their loved ones? The answer can’t simply be ‘culture’, because then we don’t have a reason for why it occurs in all human societies, as far as can be told. The ultimate answer is that it is a product of our inheritance as primates and manifests itself in behaviours that privileges those our brains are programmed to believe are related to us (almost entirely unconsciously).
Read Chapais’s Primeval Kinship. It is a wonderful book and it addresses many of the features you find so problematic (but which simply are not).
And in fact, Yanomami people do have a way of knowing whether or not they are related. It’s far from foolproof and it is certainly not limited to the Yanomami. It is simply this: human brains make inferences about who is related to their carriers through experience, primarily childhood co-residence (but also, probably, language as well – although this has comparatively little effect for a number of reasons). This tells us, approximately, who may be related to us. It’s a rough mechanism, not a precise instrument. It’s just a guideline, but one that has been a successful evolutionary strategy for Homo sapiens sapiens.
@docG–Thanks for the response (about three or four comments above. Knot untied.
@docG and Al: Interesting, vigorous, and thorough discussion. It is a reminder of what I like about Savage Minds.
Al West:
“Why do Yanomami (I’m not sure where you’re getting the transliteration Yanoama from; it doesn’t appear to be a standard anywhere)”
“Yanoama” was at one time the standard term among anthropologists, which for some reason got altered, perhaps by Chagnon himself, to Yanomami or Yanomamo. I have a problem generally with such alterations, since they smell of political correctness. There is clearly no one way of pronouncing ANY word in any language, there will always be variants, even among native speakers. Moreover, all sorts of terms originating in other languages have been anglicized when introduced into English. We don’t say “Italia,” we say “Italy,” we don’t say “Français,” we say “French.” And so on. Ad infinitum. But anthropology has been so overwhelmed by the most rigid forms of p. c. that we are now forced to accept only the “officially” approved names of all sorts of people who could care less what we call them. I also prefer “Yanoama” because it sounds cool. “Yanomamo” sounds clunky. I’m a poet, language is my turf, so I reserve the right to choose, sorry.
To resume:
“Why do Yanomami people protect their siblings, cousins, parents, etc? . . . Well, partly because they are told to do so, but also because of their phylogenetic inheritance as human beings. The genetic inheritance has primacy in determining the phenomenon and is cross-culturally applicable. This is important.”
I agree that it’s important to recognize all sorts of possible links between genetic inheritance and culture, and see no reason to assume that mutual support of kinsmen could not be due, at least in part, to the effects of natural selection. But as I see it, and others will certainly correct me if I’m wrong, this sort of thinking is already part of mainstream anthropology. So what sort of value-added benefit does Chagnon’s brand of sociobiology bring to the table, other than confusing the issue with misleading metaphors regarding “costs,” “benefits,” “investments,” “favors” etc.?
While he denies it, his terminology strongly implies exactly what Sahlins has accused him of: mysticism. And if it isn’t mysticism, and it isn’t mainstream anthropology, then what the FUCK is it? (Pardon my Français.)
More from Al:
“Yes, you’re right. It’s about motivation. And where does that motivation come from? The motivation to assist people who are closely related to you comes from your phylogenetic heritage. I’m amazed that you find this so troublesome.”
I don’t find it troublesome at all. As a possibility. I’m not sure it’s been established, but it is certainly a reasonable assumption. But what you are talking about is retroactive motivation, motivation based on what happened in the past — i.e., a genetically determined inclination toward kin altruism based on many thousands or even millions of years of natural selection “favoring” the support of close kin. I have no problem with that, and can’t see why anyone else would. But what Chagnon is talking about, and what appears to be the position of sociobiologists generally, is NOT retroactive, but proactive, theorized as some sort of “investment” in the future, based on some sort of “cost-benefit” analysis. And in order to see it as proactive, then there has to be some mechanism that enables people to project, either consciously or unconsciously, the effects of their actions on the future, and also for them to care about such effects. I see no such mechanism, nor any reason for them to care.
“What makes people want to fight for their loved ones? The answer can’t simply be ‘culture’, because then we don’t have a reason for why it occurs in all human societies, as far as can be told. The ultimate answer is that it is a product of our inheritance as primates and manifests itself in behaviours that privileges those our brains are programmed to believe are related to us (almost entirely unconsciously).”
You’ve raised a very interesting issue. We definitely need a reason why such behavior is so commonly found in so many different societies all over the world. I really like this point because it conveniently leads into to one of my all time favorite topics, i.e., my book, which as you will have noticed, I love to reference whenever appropriate. Here once again is the link, folks, just in case you might have missed it: http://soundingthedepths.blogspot.com/
It is often assumed that behaviors common to all humans must be either biologically grounded, or due to some mysterious process of convergence, based on the fixed idea that culture is continually changing, which has led to extreme skepticism regarding the possibility of long term cultural “survivals.” My book is intended as a long overdue corrective to that idea. So I would not agree that the biological explanation is our only alternative.
Mutual support of those perceived as close kin, which is not commonly found among non-human animals, may well have originated as an ancestral tradition, and not necessarily be due to natural selection. After all, if it confers such enormous advantages on humans, then, if it’s purely biological, why wouldn’t it also be found among non-humans?
I tend to believe it’s both biological AND cultural. But in both cases it stands to reason it could only be motivated retroactively, by conditions in the past, and not proactively, by “investments” in the future.
I’m also not defending Chagnon per se, but rather an interpretation of the axe fight that Chagnon spearheaded (as indeed he did, some time ago). If this is now mainstream in anthropology, that’s a good thing. Moreover, if we are to truly understand evolution, then it has to be understood in terms of costs and benefits. This is precisely how it works, even in things like sexual selection and mimicry. So Chagnon’s terminology of investment is actually par for the course and not at all strange. You are right that it would be weird if he was saying that individual Yanomami people make deliberate, conscious economic decisions with regard to genetics, a subject of which they were until recently entirely unaware. But that isn’t what he is saying. Principle of charity, people.
His interpretation of the fight is wrong to the extent that he won’t see the hand of experience and, for want of a better word, ‘culture’, in such scenarios. There is surely something of it there, especially when it comes to identifying more distant kin (figures a chimpanzee, having no experience of, will not be able to identify as kin at all in absence of language). But he is broadly correct in seeing the axe fight as an exemplar of human reactions to threats to their close kin, and explanations in terms of costs and benefits in an evolutionary model are appropriate.
It is almost certainly due to natural selection. And it does occur in other species. Chimpanzees and other primates defend their close kin, as do most other animals. In fact, protecting close kin is practically a definitive aspect of animal life. Again, I recommend Chapais. Primeval Kinship justly received rave reviews and, like I said, answers your concerns. It also presents a far, far, far more parsimonious explanation of incest taboos and differential treatment of close kin than the idea of a ‘long-term cultural survival’. That was originally proposed by Levi-Strauss (it’s certainly not a new idea) and is, frankly, absurd. It does not explain the data at all. There is much more support for the Westermarck effect as a product of natural selection than the mere presence of universal incest taboos, and your view would explain literally none of the other evidence even if it managed to explain the incest taboos (which it wouldn’t).
I very much appreciate your explanations, Al, and they do help me better understand at least some aspects of the sociobiological argument. However, I remain troubled, first, by the vocabulary of sociobiology, at least as it’s applied by Chagnon, who stresses the “investment” metaphor, because I find that extremely misleading. It does in fact give the impression that current actors are aware of the genetic consequences of their acts, which, as Chagnon ultimately admits, is NOT the case. Well, if that’s not the case, then clearly there is no psychology of investment, so how is that metaphor helpful? All it does is add to the confusion over the meaning of that troublesome phrase “the selfish gene.” Clearly there are no selfish genes and equally clearly there are no investments in the future of such genes, which are NOT a commodity.
I’m troubled also by Chagnon’s refusal to consider the very likely possibilitiy that the Yanoama support their kin simply for the usual reasons already provided by anthropology, which have nothing to do with genes or genetics. Unless he can find a way to distinguish purely culturally motivated behavior from genetically motivated behavior, then the ax fight “experiment” is pointless and the correlations he finds between those who support one another and kinship cannot be used to support the sociobiological position.
“Chimpanzees and other primates defend their close kin, as do most other animals. In fact, protecting close kin is practically a definitive aspect of animal life.”
Is that really the case? Chimpanzees, maybe. But “most other animals”? Where do you get that? Mothers protect their children, obviously, so in that sense, yes. But fathers usually do not, in fact they often attack them, when given the chance. And I see no evidence that brothers and sisters or cousins take risks to protect one another among the great majority of animals. A pack or herd contains animals related genetically in a great variety of ways, but I see no evidence that the animals in a pack or herd give special preference to their closest kin when attacked by predators.
One thing that needs to be considered, by the way, is the very real possibility that natural selection need not always be biological, but could very well operate on a purely cultural level. So instead of positing a gene for kin support, one could just as easily posit a tradition that has the same effect. If in fact kin support confers a significant advantage as an adaptation, then in the context of natural selection it matters not whether it’s genetically or culturally determined. The effect is the same.
And if, in fact, such behavior is purely culturally determined, and if, in fact, it confers an adaptive advantage, then that would explain how such a tradition could survive over very long time periods indeed, and be so widespread, since other societies lacking such a tradition would have been at an evolutionary disadvantage and ultimately died out.
If sociobiologists want to establish that behaviors such as kin support are in fact genetic and not cultural, then as it seems to me, they would need to identify a specific “kin support gene,” or group of genes. Or else they would need to demonstrate very specifically a tendency for individuals to support kin with which they actually do share genes over kin with which they don’t, as in the thought experiment I proposed.
Whew. At this point, I’d like to remind anyone still following this discussion that my original intention was to support Chagnon, or at least support his contention that violent behavior could be determined genetically — though my reasons are not at all the same as his. He sees something primordial in violent behavior, based on genetic structures inherited no doubt from pre-human ancestors, while I see violence emerging relatively late, in the wake of a population bottleneck, or bottlenecks, in which highly aggressive and competitive individuals might well have a better chance at survival. Such a situation could have had both cultural and biological consequences, and I see no reason to insist that genetics could not have played a role.
I see no reason, however, to assume violent individuals are motivated toward violent behavior out of some concern for the future of their genes, as predicted by sociobiology. If such behavior enhances ones opportunities to “mate” with members of the opposite sex, then the prospects for sexual gratification would seem the most likely motivator by far. Fathers of children conceived via rape have traditionally shown little or no interest in the welfare of their offspring.
Those reasons depend on genes and genetics, which is why they are found universally. This isn’t a particularly controversial point anymore, although it often goes unacknowledged. Again, I recommend Chapais, whose book is, I think, the best demonstration of this. If you think clans, lineages, kindreds, or nuclear families form without any genetic compulsion, and if you think they are universal because of a tradition that has nothing to do with genetics, then you are simply, utterly, completely wrong. There are very good, well-understood, reasons why humans form these groups and defend family members.
I’m not sure there’s all that much point in re-iterating the points above. You appear to have a poor grasp of evolutionary theory, at least as it is applied to humans, and have acquired an appalling straw man of Chagnon’s argument. You also don’t seem to have thought through your argument at all; just because something provides a biological advantage, that doesn’t mean it confers a social one.
There is no reason why a cultural group that had incest taboos and kin preference would prosper over a group that had no incest taboos and no preference for kin, absent any biological considerations. After all, the latter would have a wider range of mates to go for, and they’d have no problem forming states or fighting for one another with the same intensity as humans fight for their family members. A group that privileged forging military connections with large cohorts of others for the purposes of over-running their weird incest-obsessed kin-freak neighbours would easily win out in a confrontation, as far as I can see. You need to demonstrate that this is cultural, or makes sense that it should be, before proclaiming a parity between biological and social selection models.
There is no such parity. The biological facts reign supreme in this field. Kin preference, kin recognition, and incest avoidance with childhood co-residents are hard-wired features of human psychology and they are a product of our phylogenetic inheritance, as we can see in the ethnographic record, in normal daily life, in comparative primatological studies, and in such events as the Yanomami axe fight. These do not wholly determine social and cultural notions of kinship, but such notions wouldn’t even exist without this genetic basis.
@Al
“Those reasons depend on genes and genetics”
Well then, please explain to me what it was that Chagnon was hoping to establish in his analysis of the ax fight. As I read that report, the fact that individuals tended to defend their own kin was somehow supposed to be evidence supporting a genetic basis for that sort of behavior. But how can the behavior itself be evidence for the existence of whatever is supposed to be motivating that behavior? Where do the genes come in? What he seems to be saying (also what you seem to be saying) is that since we already know ahead of time that such behavior is genetically based, then the very existence of that behavior somehow proves it. Looks to me like a circular argument.
As for the rest I’m open to the consideration of the theory you’re so convinced is right, but at this point I find it far from convincing.
As far as I can tell, all sorts of traditions can be fully explained without recourse to genetics. Of course, we have no way of knowing for sure that some gene for such and such a tradition might be lurking in our DNA, but where is the rule telling us this HAS to be the case?
I’m wondering what you might think of the following, for example:
As is well known, washing one’s hands under various circumstances, including before eating, is a time honored tradition among orthodox Jews and has been in all likelihood for many thousands of years, going back to Biblical times and probably well before then. It seem reasonable to assume, moreover, that this practice gave Jews a survival advantage over other groups, since, as we now know, washing is a defense against the spread of infections, both bacterial and viral. So in this case one could argue that some sort of Darwinian process was at work that facilitated Jewish survival over so many thousands of years. And if other competing groups succumbed to diseases that Jews never got, then that looks to me like a classic case of “natural” selection.
Now what could have been the origin of such a tradition? If you want to argue that it’s based on some genetic proclivity among Jews and Jews alone, which gave them some sort of compulsion to wash, then you have to explain why this tradition has so completely died out among all but orthodox Jews today. Since we have no reason to assume that assimilated Jews, who don’t wash more often than non-Jews, have a different genetic makeup than orthodox Jews, then clearly ritual washing cannot be the result of some genetically motivated compulsion.
While the origins of this tradition are lost in antiquity, one can still speculate regarding various possibilities, and one possibility that’s occurred to me is that the origin could have been in a dream. And while I’m happy to admit I could be wrong, I see no reason to reject such a possibility, especially since it provides us with something you claim to be impossible, i.e., a reasonable hypothesis for the non-genetic origin of a particular tradition.
Some important person, a king perhaps, or an influential rabbi, could have had a dream in which God commanded him to wash under various circumstances. And the king or rabbi could then have communicated this to the community at large, with the result that it became established as a tradition which was then passed on from generation to generation. Imo many traditions most likely started in more or less the same way.
Are you willing to see this as an exception to the rule you’ve so confidently stated? Or do you see some problem with my facts or my reasoning?
It is evidence that these features are universal. And, importantly, each person defended their kin in proportion to the closeness of their relationship. So it indicates that it is universal and depends on a genetic foundation because it fits the predictions of the theory.
No, it’s a hypothetico-deductive argument. It says that we should expect humans, even in situations so different from the ones we know and that contain cultural settings that bias our behaviour, to protect their kin in proportion to their level of genetic relationship. It turns out that humans do indeed do this, providing support – in this case a perfect example – for the hypothesis that these universally human features have a genetic basis.
Because I guarantee that you don’t understand it, and as I see it you’re embarrassing yourself. I guess you’re also missing the data and evidence. Fair enough: go and read some more about it, especially Primeval Kinship.
I have absolutely no idea how this is anything like an exception to any rule that I have ‘confidently stated’. Are you even bothering to read what I’m saying, or are you using this primarily to advertise your book? As it happens, we have a reasonably good understanding of the mechanisms, including the innate basis, of human incest taboos, and they do reduce quite simply to the facts of biology: inbreeding is deleterious and recognising kin is essential. Protecting others who share your genetic material is also something we should expect given the long gestation period and other facts of human biology (and thereby pair-bonding, monogamy, and relatively low fertility).
But this in no way implies that all human traditions have such origins, or that all practices with a genetic aspect originated in primate ancestors without any cultural input. In the Andes and Himalayas, for instance, the necessity of many people to use land further and further up mountain slopes for pasture or horticulture led to the necessary genetic innovation of higher red blood cell counts that enable them to survive and prosper in the anoxic environment. This was a genetic change produced by cultural causes. But this clearly doesn’t apply to something that a) is found universally in humans and b) has clear antecedents in the behaviour of other primates.
Also, I am not a sociobiologist. I don’t believe all human acts are determined solely by genetic inheritance. It’s just that many human behaviours – perhaps especially those concerned with reproduction – have a clear genetic basis underlying the considerable diversities in practice. You appear to have a pet theory that you don’t want to question. It seems the basis of your theory is an evidence-less fallacy of the mean: it’s not genetic or cultural in origin, but genetic and cultural in origin, thereby being more reasonable than either extreme! But it has no evidence in its favour and rests entirely on disputing your poorly understood interpretations of a narrow slice of the data. Not scientific and not sensible.
“And, importantly, each person defended their kin in proportion to the closeness of their relationship. So it indicates that it is universal and depends on a genetic foundation because it fits the predictions of the theory.”
But the opposite theory, that the motivation to defend one’s kin “in proportion to the closeness of their relationship” is due solely to culturally determined factors based on kinship as traditionally understood, with genetics playing no role, fits the data equally well. I don’t think many people would dispute the notion that someone is more likely to defend a brother than a cousin, simply because brothers have usually been brought up together and have a closer bond. The same would be true for friendship. One would most likely defend a close friend who one has spent more time with than a casual acquaintance.
“It turns out that humans do indeed do this, providing support – in this case a perfect example – for the hypothesis that these universally human features have a genetic basis.”
Sorry, but I see no role for genetics in this “experiment.” It’s about the well known tendency for individuals to bond more closely with close relatives. If he had been able to demonstrate that the Yanoama were more likely to support relatives with the greatest number of genes in common and less likely to support relatives with fewer genes in common, then that would be different. But even in that case, it would be necessary to explain how each individual had been able to gain such information.
“Because I guarantee that you don’t understand it”
Well, apparently I’m in good company. Sahlins clearly doesn’t understand it either, and neither to the many anthropologists who have essentially branded Chagnon a fraud. I would not go so far, because I do feel he’s contributed much of value and that some of his ideas regarding the role of genetics in culture do make sense to me. But I’m sorry, his interpretation of the ax fight IS, as I stated earlier: balderdash. I’m amazed you can’t see the very obvious problem.
Yes. Yes, it is. That is precisely what it is about. So where did that tendency come from?
How does kinship work? Why is it there? What is it? How does it come about? Why is it that kinship in Yanomami societies is functionally so similar to kinship in every other human society, with individuals in general supporting their close kin? Why is it that humans support their close kin more than others? Why do they preferentially help people more closely related to them? Why would ‘culture’ favour this? What would be the mechanism for this? What is its origin? Where does ‘kinship as traditionally understood’ come from?
The point was that the axe fight showed the universality of human kinship in the most basic sense and perfectly fit the predictions of the theory that more closely related individuals will aid one another, with the theory stating, on the basis of established evolutionary theory, that this is due to their shared genes. The mechanism for this knowledge of kin – which somehow hasn’t penetrated your brain – is childhood co-residence and language, with the former playing a greater role than the latter. It’s called imprinting. You are quite right that if we relied solely on the axe fight, we wouldn’t have much of an argument. It could be interpreted in terms of some ‘cultural’ aspect with an unknown, solely cultural aetiology in absence of other evidence. But it’s not the only evidence. There is an enormous amount of evidence for this position now. You appear to be unaware of all of it.
How do they know how their relatives are? Imprinting. How do they know that they share genes? They don’t, because they don’t have a concept of ‘gene’ as far as I know, but they have human brains, and human brains differentiate kin – or what they suppose to be kin – on the basis of residence and shared experiences during a critical period. As it happens, and as Mother Nature knows*, residence tends to overlap with close genetic relationship, largely because of the long and vulnerable gestation and childhood periods in humans, and because humans are mammals, and female mammals typically have mammaries. It is for these reasons that this tendency came about in primates and, more specifically, in humans: favour close kin, differentiate kin, don’t have sex with kin, help in proportion to perceived closeness of relationship.
That is how Yanomami people know. It’s how you know, and it’s why (I assume) you don’t want to fuck your sister (if you have one). It’s how we have such phenomena as genetic sexual attraction, which results when two siblings meet up after separation before or early in childhood – knowing that they’re related but not feeling the same about one another as co-resident siblings do. It’s not a foolproof mechanism by any means, but evolution doesn’t seem to operate by foolproof mechanisms.
This is such a strange argument. You really appear to understand none of it.
*I realise I probably shouldn’t use a colourful metaphor here, because apparently you find these so confusing that you think people who use them are making different arguments to the ones you think they are (‘selfish gene’ and all that). So I’ll be clear: there is no Mother Nature, and this is a colourful metaphor.
@Al
You write,
“It is evidence that these features are universal. And, importantly, each person defended their kin in proportion to the closeness of their relationship. So it indicates that it is universal and depends on a genetic foundation because it fits the predictions of the theory.”
Was Ptolemy’s earth-centered model of the social system correct because it predicted planetary motion correctly (at least as correctly as Copernicus’ heliocentric model and without predicting stellar parallax, which wouldn’t be visible until the invention of telescopes)?
It seems to me that to resolve your debate with DocG we need a comparative study of feuds and brawls in which the fighting parties align themselves as kin, with a sample large enough to include multiple forms of kinship:matrineal, patrilineal, bilateral to varying degrees, with or without parallel or cross-cousin marriage, etc. We might, then, be able to see to what extent biogenetic kinsmen took sides based on genes as opposed to cultural considerations.
Consider, for example, the case of football hooligans, who frequently engage in violent confrontations. Do they square off along kinship lines?
And what about conscript armies?
Here’s the thing: kin recognition is ‘innate’ in that people appear to have an innate capacity to recognise ‘kin’ based on residence during childhood. Children who grow up together, whether genetically related or not, avoid sexual intercourse with one another and even find the idea disgusting. There have been mass studies of these things.
It is also clear that it would be advantageous to favour close kin in a genetic sense for a very well-understood reason: evolution is primarily about the survival of genes, and close kin share genes. Aaaand we see this kind of preferential treatment everywhere on earth, in every human community, and not just in axe or fist fights. In modern states, we haven’t gotten rid of nepotism – merely tried to limit its impact. We feel favourably disposed towards close kin in general. This appears to be innate.
Combine the two – the ability to recognise kin, and the desire to treat them preferentially, in general, all else equal – and you’ve basically got the axe fight already.
You’re right that we can always use more data, but I’m really not sure clan loyalties are any different from states or armies or corporate offices. Clans use a kinship idiom and are organised by kin, but that doesn’t mean they depend on the same tendency to prefer kin in precisely the same way because of the manner in which they recruit. You don’t live with all your clan members or recognise them as kin in the same way that you recognise your mother and father This may be why there were people from each family on both sides of the Hatfield and McCoy dispute.
There are rules in clans as in offices, and you have to follow them, and there are both rewards and punishments. These provide reasons for action. The innate tendency to prefer close kin merely supplies a single desire – a reason for action – that can conflict with other desires. My brother is a prison guard; I believe he would try not to treat me differently from other inmates were I ever to end up in prison. I also believe he would find it hard to do so.
There is an innate basis to human kinship, demonstrable in so many contexts but especially in comparing humans with primates and extrapolating from the vast amount of existing primatological data. And it affects all kinds of behaviours. But it also responds to other variables. The biology doesn’t wholly determine human action in this way, I don’t think. It just makes some actions that much more likely than others.
Al, I thought I made it clear from the beginning that I have no serious problem with your major argument. At least as an interesting and potentially meaningful hypothesis. As you have guessed, I’m not an expert on such questions and will have to defer a final decision until I’ve had an opportunity to learn more. At the moment all I can say is that it sounds like a reasonable hypothesis, but I nevertheless remain skeptical. I believe that’s my right, no?
My real problem was never with the notion that kin bonding might have a genetic basis, as you have so eloquently argued, but with the specifics of Chagnon’s analysis of the ax fight, which, as far as I can tell, makes no sense.
As far as our other dispute is concerned, the dispute regarding the possibility that certain aspects of culture can be long term survivals of ancestral traditions, going back as far as the earliest divergences identified by population geneticists, I can very well understand your skepticism, as it reflects a long standing anthropological position. (I’m too polite to use the word “dogma” here — in mixed company. 🙂 )
If I happen to be right, however, then the “universality” (I prefer “widespread distribution”) of strong kinship bonds could very simply be due to the survival of some such long standing tradition originating with the MRCA identified by the population geneticists. As I see it, and as I tried to demonstrate with the example of Jewish hand washing, culturally based traditions can also be subject to the forces of “natural” selection (or, if you prefer, “cultural selection”), so just because a practice can be explained in such terms (or as you might argue, can ONLY be explained in such terms) does not necessarily mean it must have a genetic basis.
I must confess that the genetic explanation you offer sounds far too mechanistic and also simplistic to account for the complexities of human relationships and loyalties. If it’s simply a matter of identifying those most likely to share our genes, then what explains the existence of very similar loyalties among close friends, with no genetic affinities?
I’ll admit, however, that I need to learn more and your comments have served as a very useful introduction to this very interesting topic.
in general, all else equal
Al, there’s the rub. Where, in human history or ethnography, do we find cases where all else is equal?
Also, re methodology, there is a substantial literature on why it isn’t safe to combine two propositions that both look plausible and draw a conclusion from them without a systematic effort to falsify the connection. The phenomenal world is full of spurious correlations. You know that, don’t you?
What does it mean, for example, for kids to grow up together? In the same household? The same village? The same county, or country, or continent? Is kin selection something like the law of gravity with an infinite reach but decreasing effect with distance? If so what does the curve look like? How does your theory deal with stuff that doesn’t fit so well, e.g., sworn brotherhood and belonging to different triads in China? Feudal loyalties in medieval Europe or Japan? Being Chelsea or Arsenal fans? Nazis or members of the French Resistance. Lots of fights out there. Lots of cases where people take different sides. Are they all grounded in kin-selection? If not, how can you tell the difference?
I believe that is a matter for your perceptual system to decide. Kin recognition is primarily useful for avoiding incest and it works because residence in the same dwelling overlaps with genetic closeness. It’s cue-based; I assume we’d have to look deeper in the literature to find the exact parameters, and I expect there’s some variation anyway.
Of course. What matters is that Chagnon’s interpretation of the axe fight as just one of those rare occasions where all else appeared to be equal is justified by a reasonable background in theory and experiment. Consider all of the evidence and the proposition that human kin recognition is innate is well-supported. As this has been the case for some time now, the proposition has been tested in a multitude of ways and its core evidence has been repeatedly dissected. The axe fight is merely an exemplar, and it is now a minor, and frankly rather old, piece of evidence. Chagnon’s interpretation was not straight-up wrong, however, but broadly correct, as far as can be told. I believe it is his other claims that are controversial.
I doubt it. But now we’re getting into theories of altruism and the basis of human eusociality (if we can call it that). I don’t think sworn brotherhoods and bands of warriors invalidate the hypothesis that kin recognition is innate. Depending on the closeness of the bond, it could indeed depend on the same framework, but I’m not sure. I would note that a segmentary system is just this sort of thing, however, and such systems appear to exhibit the principles and exceptions we would expect – nominal clan membership being over-ridden by residence, etc.
I would also note that there are theories that state that these kind of group engagements are possible because humans innately prefer people who look and act like they do. That would be a reasonable supposition, but harder to support experimentally than simple kin recognition and preference. It would also be a rubbish thing to find out for our species.
There are better defenders of the idea than me, in any case.
docG,
I do not see how kinship could have arisen as a common factor in all human societies if it isn’t based on something innate. If it were simply a cultural phenomenon, it also wouldn’t be so hard to get rid of – we wouldn’t have a nepotism problem.
The problem with your theory is that it has no mechanism. Kin selection may appear mechanistic, but that’s the point – there has to be a natural cause, and those operate in mechanistic ways. Earlier, you were complaining that kin selection appeared teleological, and now you’re complaining that it’s too mechanistic.
@John. Did you get my email? I can’t find your email, so wrote you via the web site at your business. Tony
Tony, your message didn’t reach me. Why I do not know. You, and anyone else who would care to, can reach me directly by sending email to jlm[at]wordworks.jp
Al, I will be blunt in a scientific manner.
1. You say that Chagnon’s interpretation is one of those rare instances to which all other things being equal applies.
2. I say that this is a data point cherry-picked to illustrate a spurious correlation.
How can we tell the difference? This is scientific method 101. Collect an unbiased sample of similar cases for comparison and look, in particular, for cases that falsify hypothesis 1. 2 is an inference from the null hypothesis.
Note: A critical issue is how we define “similar.” To restrict our sample to fights between people who regard themselves as belonging to different kin groups is to bias the research in favor of 1 at the outset. No,duh. Every case sampled can be interpreted as involving kin-selection.
Note: The central issue is why do people wind up on opposite sides of violent, possibly deadly, conflict. There are endless cases in which the “kin” claim is spurious, “brothers-in-arms” who belong to conscript armies, crowds of football hooligans, the hooligans’ counterparts who supported the Greens or the Blues in Byzantine chariot races, anyone an easily add to the list. If we include these in our sample, the probability that the combatants on opposite sides are biogenetic kin declines sharply.
Note: That there is something in genetically grounded human nature that predisposes H. Sapiens to line up on opposite sides to engage in violent conflict can only be denied by the idealists among us. That this tendency is related to kin-selection remains to be demonstrated. Chagnon’s one data point is not a demonstration.
Ah, I see. You’re thinking only in terms of fights, not in terms of kin recognition. I’m arguing that kin recognition and kin preference is innate and for very good, well-established reasons. This sometimes plays itself out in fights, but not all fights separate along kinship lines, and there’s little reason to think that they would. The axe fight is one data point, you are correct, which is why I have stressed the multitude of other evidence, almost all of which is available in excellent published materials. The axe fight simply happened to perfectly fit the sociobiological model; as the model we have now is clearly responsive to a great number of different variables, we should expect deviation from this.
You are quite right. This is because people fight over other things than merely genetic relationships. I believe Chagnon would also say that people fight over other things than women or genes, because this is obvious and demonstrable, but to deny that humans privilege the people they perceive to be their close kin over others because of an innate mechanism is to deny a well-established fact. It is supported by far more than simply one video of one fight.
You are correct. There are also cases in which the kin definitely aren’t genetically related, and know it, but love and support one another just as any set of brothers and sisters do, because the mechanism is unconscious imprinting, not higher knowledge of a relationship or a metaphorical association.
I don’t think there is an especially water-tight case for a genetic, innate, human predisposition to fight in groups. It’s certainly not as good a case as the case for the Westermarck effect and its social and genetic implications. I think there’s a good case, however, for the notion that kin will support close kin, known through residence, in any fight that involves them. They will prefer to save kin over strangers. And the reasons for this have to reside in human phylogenetic inheritance, especially as similar traits are also found in non-language-using primates. There is a mountain of evidence for this conclusion, and, as I have said, I like Bernard Chapais’s Primeval Kinship as the best introduction to it.
I suspect most of you here are social/cultural anthropologists who are more comfortable linking anthropology to philosophy or postmodernism than to biology or genetics.
Can you prove to me that an indigenous group’s murderous behavior is not genetic? You can’t. So, I don’t think you can really say Chagnon’s use of biology in interpreting culture is wrong.
I stopped questioning the existence of God long ago because I could not prove its nonexistence.
Anthropology is a discipline where a cultural phenomenon has many interpretations. It is an interpretive discipline. A certain interpretation is considered valid when it is widely believed.
It’s too bad that Chagnon’s use of biology sounds ridiculous to most. I wonder if you will say a word if he uses a postmodernist route in interpreting warfare as a component of a peace process in a headhunting culture, although that idea is fictional and beyond reality. I suspect this is a case of a popular theory silencing an unpopular one.
You should be questioning the works of those postmodernists who interpret culture as if anthropology is a literary or philosophical discipline.
Since my interest is in the biology of economics, are you going to question my view if I interpret headhunting among Ilonggots as genetic and related to reproduction, food resources, kinship, inherited traits the Illongots themselves believe to be so?
I happen to believe that we all have primitive traits, which include murderous behavior for survival and self-preservation. It is culture that molds us and makes such traits profound.
A headhunter’s culture conditions him, who is predisposed genetically to headhunt, to become one. If you think that’s not true, prove it or shut up. My proof is simple: a headhunter being a son or grandson or great grandson of headhunters is not only about family name, honor, wealth, and resources but also about genetics. Ilonggots can tell you about warfare and genetics.
Nobody here hates genetics or biology. We are just inclined to mock researchers with a genetic predisposition for ignoring interesting and complex scientific hypothesis in favor of some common sense fetish theory of “how brown/primitive people are violent because they are like our ancestors”.
Seriously, whoever thinks this “postmodernism” vs. “biology” does not understand what the hell is going on.
“I happen to believe that we all have primitive traits, which include murderous behavior for survival and self-preservation. It is culture that molds us and makes such traits profound.”
So headhunting is a “primitive trait”, a “murderous behavior for survival and self-preservation” that is made “profound” by “cultural traits”. What else can I say? Go for it mate! I’m sure it’s going to be a best seller.
If headhunting is a murderous behavior for survival, I wonder what modern bureaucratic war is?
Prove it? What an unreasonable, unscientific burden of proof. Completely ridiculous.
Headhunting in Austronesian-speaking southeast Asia appears to be a tradition going back as far as, possibly, the Neolithic, around 5,000 years ago. It is a strange package of different behaviours arbitrarily lumped together by millennia of tradition and the founder effect. It makes no sense to think of this as a phenomenon that is first and foremost ‘genetic’. Of course it relies on shared human traits to be found in our genomes (it would be hard for a chimp or a rock to be a headhunter, for instance), but to attempt to explain the phenomenon in those terms is beyond absurd.
You appear to have little understanding of how science works and no understanding of how we can validate or falsify theories, whether in anthropology or any other empirical discipline. There is an awful lot of dreck in anthropology, for sure, but the way to get rid of dreck isn’t to replace it with dreck of a different flavour.
Isn’t linking theories on ritual and performance to violence ridiculous?
I’m mocking anthropology as science in which theory-based interpretation is its scientific method.
I should be blatant next time.
Like Paglia, I also ask if those feminist anthropologists consider Vogue a social artifact and its cover in which a female model wears Gucci glasses an image of misogyny since her vision is dimmed or blinded.
Wild interpretations like that plague anthropology. I see no science in that method–interpreting data to make a theory relevant.
“I’m mocking anthropology as science in which theory-based interpretation is its scientific method.”
O H M Y! Is that THE method used in anthropology? Nobody told me! I thought anthropologist did fieldwork, collected quantitative and qualitative data, observed a collective for months or years, conducted interviews, participated in their lived world them wrote something about that. Anthropology, my dear friend, is not what postmodernism wants it to be and has produced relevant scientific knowledge. Theoretical constructs like “ritual” or”performance” should be nothing but tools. This recurrent idea that “anthropology has no method” or “is not scientific” is not new, and it is even worth discussing. Replacing anthropological knowledge with some shallow genetic determinism is also an old project, carried on by people who still believe that the sociobiology of the 70’s had all the answers. The sociobiology changed, the physical anthropology changed, and the project is still out there.
Your problems with the feminists I leave to your freudian analyst, or theirs.
I see two serious barriers to resolving this sort of debate.
1. The original problem is cast in terms of categorical oppositions (postmodernism versus biology is an excellent example), and
2. the relationship between general principles and observed outcomes is left obscure.
Suppose, instead, we look at variation, first across species and then across human groups. There is ample evidence that agonistic behavior in defense of territories or as part of mating games is widespread, at least among vertebrates, birds, fishes and mammals, including other primates as well as H. sapiens. In most cases, however, the combat is ritualized, stereotyped in forms that result in one animal giving up before serious damage is done. What is extraordinary in H. sapiens is the range of variation across populations within the species. Thus, for example, among Native Americans, diverse attitudes toward hostility and its proper forms of expression can be found even in neighboring groups: Hopi, Navajo, Apache and Comanche, for example. Genetically speaking members of pacifist Amish communities and SS Stormtroopers were of the same, basic German stock. To attribute these variations to direct one-to-one mappings from genes to behavior is ridiculous in the extreme.
Does this mean that genetic dispositions play no role in human violence? To say that would be silly, too. The critical point is that H. sapiens is the most plastic of creatures at birth. The extent to which genetic dispositions are expressed in physical or verbal violence, insulting gestures, or disdainful raised eyebrows cannot be traced to genes alone.
Whether Yanamamo violence was (1) overstated, (2) common in the “original” culture, or (3) due at least in part to stressful contact with non-Yanomamo, including perhaps an aberrant anthropologist cannot be determined without more evidence and more careful analysis than we have seen here so far.
P.S. Taking heads as trophies is widely reported throughout throughout Eurasia and by no means confined to Austronesian Southeast Asia.
Cortacabezas, maybe this paper by a first year BPhil student will help you see theory bias, theoretical preconceptions, and theory-ladennes of observation in anthropology–yes, that includes ethnography and participant-observation you considered scientific.
http://eview.anu.edu.au/cross-sections/vol1/pdf/ch11.pdf
*Theory-ladenness
Another good example is Discuss White Privilege. Because of his/her theoretical biases and preconceptions about racism, he/she will always have something to say about white privilege even though the topic/subject is Polynesian dance. A person like him can easily interpret the story of Snow White as an anti-black racist narrative. Imagine if he is an anthropologist, and he/she brings that bias and preconception to the field.
Certainly true. But actually many groups even in southeast Asia, including Ilongot headhunters, threw the heads in the air instead of taking them home – they didn’t collect heads. Headhunting, of a sort, was also found in the Americas. Shuar shrunken heads were trophies of this sort, and as I mentioned in a recent blogpost, Conibo warriors used to hang the dried heads and hearts of their enemies from the rafters of their houses. There’s certainly something visceral about decapitation that makes it a perfect sign of martial prowess (it’s invariably fatal, and humans appear to have an evolved capacity for facial recognition, requiring a focus on the face and head), and I suppose that has to be based on some innate mental gear, but that innate mental gear is clearly insufficient to explain the activity.
“But actually many groups even in southeast Asia, including Ilongot headhunters, threw the heads in the air instead of taking them home – they didn’t collect heads.”
Who told you that? Prized heads were collected, smoked and mummified, and displayed outside of Ilonggot/Bungkalot headhunters’ houses. If there were heads that were thrown away, they had no value or were of lowest rank or unimportant in the creation of a headhunter’s narrative about his bravery. Of course he would not include a head with just one functioning eye. That would make others question his courage and masculinity. Ilonggots/Bungkalots, until now, do not take pride in killing someone not their match.