While the history of the term is intriguing, it certainly makes our modern quibbles seem inconsequential, or at least a bit ethnocentric. Whereas the English word for person has its own particular history, there is likely a similar concept in most societies around the world, both modern and ancient. It’s probably also the case that these other concepts of persons can shed light on the more general notion of what a person could be (cue the anthropologists). Thus, an anthropological perspective on the term person would provide a sort of external validity in our own arguments, just as it does for so many other discussions. However, the problem runs deeper than just comparing the English concept of person to that of other languages. From primates to developing humans to artificial intelligence, we lack much internal validity in our own understanding of what a person is across disciplines. There needs to be a more synthetic underpinning for what we deem a person as opposed to the discipline-specific concepts. An understanding of ideas of personhood in each of the disciplines discussed could really use the eyes and minds of anthropologists engaged in things like Science and Technology Studies. An understanding of how scientists in these disciplines understand personhood as it relates to their own work could help build a more universally consistent concept.

My posts this month have focused on three areas in which the concept of person is important: primatology, medicine/technology, and artificial intelligence. As I’ve discussed, cognitive science and the biological sciences have enabled enormous advances in our understanding of personhood in each of these areas. However, biology and cognitive science can only get us so far with something that could be considered a value statement. They can inform it, but not really delineate it – at least not alone. Rethinking our understanding of personhood through the social sciences and humanities can help inform research in primatology, medicine, and computer science. Moreover, how personhood plays out in the legal system, such as through the work of Steve Wise and the Nonhuman Rights Project, relies deeply on informed research to push the idea of personhood beyond the human.

When they are incorporated into policy, words really matter. Definitions really matter. Although how a “person” is defined and understood may seem to be simply an academic curiosity, these understandings have direct influences on policy and action – but only if they are heard. If the ideas never leave their discipline, or worse, never leave the Ivory Tower, then they will fail to have real impact. How we treat primates and other animals. How we define a person’s life. How we grapple with human augmentation. How we will view and interact with artificially intelligent beings. All of these things – which are subject to policy – depend on how we understand personhood and how well that understanding is communicated to lawmakers and the public.

I don’t have the answers to many of the questions and problems I’ve raised. However, they are important to discuss, and discussing them with someone else who looks at the problem from a different angle can help solidify more universal concepts and lead to practical solutions. So, exercise your academic curiosity. Engage in esoteric discussions. That’s how the gritty work gets done. But, at the end of the day, don’t forget to engage those outside of your discipline. Better yet, get outside of the Academy and share your work with those who probably haven’t heard about it.

*Thanks to Agustin Fuentes, Gregory F. Tague, Barbara J. King, and Kathleen Richardson for sharing their thoughts with me on the topic of personhood during the writing of these posts. 

References

[1] Trendelenburg, A. (1910). A Contribution to the History of the Word Person. The Monist, 336-363.

We often envision true AI to resemble us – both in body and mind. The Turing Test has evolved in the collective imagination from a machine who can fool you over the phone to one who can fool you in front of your eyes. Indeed, modern conceptions of AI bring to mind Ex Machina’s Ava and WestWorld’s “Hosts,” which are so alike humans in both behavior and looks that they are truly indistinguishable from other humans. However, it seems a bit self-centered to me to assume that a being who equals us in intelligence should also look like us. Though, it is perhaps a fitting assessment for a being who gave itself the biological moniker of “wise man.” At any rate, it’s probably clear to computer scientists and exobiologists alike that “life” doesn’t necessarily need to resemble what we know it as. Likewise, “person” need not represent what we know it as.

Things like pain and emotion play an important role in how we empathize and understand one another. They are important aspects of personhood, and often arise in discussions of AI. Does the AI really feel emotion, or is it simply wired to react? It’s important to remember that the biological capability for emotional phenomena are still a product of biological evolution. They exist – or are able to exist – because something about the functional units that give rise to them were adaptive. We very well could have evolved some different method. Likewise, we can’t expect that any being that might be considered a person should have evolved the exact same method as we did. Thus, when we require something to have something like “emotion” as a criterion for personhood, are we asking it to have a personhood trait or a human trait?

It’s often suggested that we simply can’t know if an AI (or a chimp, for that matter) “feels” like we feel, if their emotions are “true.” Since emotion is frequently used as a staple of personhood, this leads to hesitation when considering AI personhood. However, the same could be said between humans. I don’t know if my sadness, my joy, my fear, or any other emotion feels the same to me as yours does to you. I express it such that you can understand what it might feel like. You might even empathize, and have your own feeling that mirrors what I am expressing. However, you still don’t know what I feel. It seems to me that the same can be said for AI. Sure, AI might need to be programmed to react to certain phenomena with an emotional output, but so are we. Just as we can adjust our reaction thanks to neural connectivity between the prefrontal cortex and amygdala, so could AI be programmed to have this capability. Remove those lines of code from the AI, and perhaps it won’t respond like it should to an emotional situation. Remove a piece of our brain, and we won’t either. Alan Turing recognized this as far back as the 1950’s. In defense of his test for machine intelligence, Turing noted that we could just as easily and logically take this solipsistic stance with regards to humans.

Ultimately, it seems that we do not need to question whether or not AI could be persons, but how we will know when they become persons. Fishing through this conceptual dilemma could be well served by comparing personhood concepts in other realms – such as primatology and medicine – to personhood in AI. We never expect other primates to become “human-like,” but we do expect, even are designing, AI to become human-like. Along the road to their human-like nature, they will pick up personhood. Should their personhood be considered on its own terms, as it might be with other primates, or should it somehow be considered in relation to humans. AI will be situated in a unique context, as persons created by persons to interact with persons. Their entire ontology will be intertwined with our existence. This ontological social cohesion of AI and humans will be subject to a particular type of analysis that anthropologists would be best suited to approach. In the same vein as ethnoprimatology, there will need to be a field of research that focuses on the ethnography of human-AI interaction. A field that will sit firmly within the discipline of anthropology.

In May of 2016, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) drafted a report regarding rules and regulations for how humans and robots interact with each other. BBC reported this past week that MEPs are due to vote on the resolution. If passed, the resolution would then move on to be debated by individual governments. The resolution was drafted in regards robots that have not achieved self-awareness, wherein Asimov’s Laws would be implemented. Interestingly, the resolution was also drafted in part to consider “creating a specific legal status for robots, so that at least the most sophisticated autonomous robots could be established as having the status of electronic persons with specific rights and obligations, including that of making good any damage they may cause, and applying electronic personality to cases where robots make smart autonomous decisions or otherwise interact with third parties independently,” as described in General Principle 31-f. Indeed, it seems the era of robot personhood is upon us, and It would behoove us to consult an interdisciplinary team of scientists, including anthropologists, about proper action moving forward. While this resolution is a good start, there will no doubt be a time when self-aware AI needs to be considered from a legal standpoint.

We will need to proceed with caution in our inexorable pursuit of true AI, lest we find ourselves in a serious ethical dilemma. Since we will be creating AI, we have the opportunity to preemptively consider the implications of their existence. Borrowing from John Locke, one of the most time-honored phrases form the Declaration of independence states that, “we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” Very soon, we will be playing the part of the “Creator.” The question now becomes whether or not we will also endow our creations with certain unalienable rights, because if we wait until they demand them, it will be too late.

When the concept of personhood in humans comes into discussion, it inevitably is punted to the medical community, often in the context of abortion and end of life. When does the heart first beat? When can a fetus feel pain? When does the brain begin/stop producing electrical activity? There is no doubt that advancements in our understanding of human physiology have enlightened discourse on what it means to be both a human and a person. However, the question of personhood is all too often debated solely in light of Western medical contexts. This conflation of physiology and personhood is the same issue that was discussed in my previous post on primate personhood and will be revisited in my next post on artificial intelligence. To escape this quandary we need to consider factors outside of physiology that are important to the concept of personhood, such as the social.

Modern American society is hyper-individualized. This isn’t inherently good or bad, but it certainly changes how we see and define persons. The lack of consensus both between citizens and between states on issues of personhood lead to confusion and hostility towards the topic. While certain state laws prohibit abortion, viewing it as a restriction of the freedom to live, some of those same states limit or deny certain social programs that would provide the fetus with social support that might be considered a legal or cultural right in some societies. Though we may value independence, as exemplified through the pursuit of the “American Dream,” this is not the case with every human society today, and certainly was not the case in humanity’s past.

With increasingly precise medical and physiological knowledge, society tries to pin down a “week” of pregnancy where the fetus is viable. But viable under what conditions? Surely a fetus is viable much earlier today than 50 years ago. Moreover, fetal viability 50 years from now may well be half as early as it is now. This begs the question, does personhood change? Specifically, is personhood status changing with respect to medical knowledge and technological advancement? This same question occurs on the back-end, too. One hundred years ago, a lack of pulse meant death – the end of personhood. Today, death is marked by lack of brain activity. As medical technology becomes ever more sophisticated, and human physiology better understood, our stretches of personhood as it relates to physiology will reach an asymptotic degree for both pre-birth and the gray areas between the end of life and death.

If (or perhaps, when) cryogenics becomes a viable technique, how will that redefine personhood? Will personhood be suspended in animation alongside the body? Better yet, what of sci-fi ideas involving “uploading” consciousness onto non-biological material? This may seem far-fetched, but most of today’s technology suffered the same fate of inevitability. When these hypotheticals instantiate, there will need to be a radical rethinking of both what it means to be a human and what it means to be a human person. Considering these ideas is difficult, as we automatically take for granted human personhood in a way that is different from considerations of personhood for chimps or AI. Nevertheless, thinking about and discussing the boundaries of personhood in relation to humans needs to be a proactive engagement, not a belated reaction.

Being a human is not just about biology, and being a person shouldn’t either. This is not to suggest that biology isn’t important in discussions of human personhood, nor am I suggesting that personhood cannot change or be influenced by advances in science and technology. However, science and technology are changing quickly; advances are mounting more quickly than they ever have before, and there are no signs of letting up. This means we need to be vigilant when it comes to concepts for which we lean heavily on science and technology to define. There are myriad ways of being human, and as many ways to define a person. We would be wise to look to other humans who are embedded in different social and cultural foundations and try to understand how they define persons. It’s not a question of right or wrong definitions, but a practice in humility and a chance to learn from the wisdom of our fellow humans. Our fellow persons.

If it is the charge of anthropology to understand the human, of which the person is integral, then anthropologists need a seat at the larger table. Many anthropologists have investigated personhood in the past, and as many continue to do so today. However, their discussions are often limited to fellow anthropologists and within the confines of academia. The discussions rarely make it out to the medical community, much less the public. By approaching the public with ideas on personhood, anthropology has an avenue through which it can influence policy and make a difference outside the academy. It’s clear to anthropologists that anthropology matters. It’s clear to anthropologists that anthropology has much to say about personhood. Let’s make that clear to the rest of the scientific community and the public.

When I moved to Chicago for graduate school, one of the first things I did was go to the Lincoln Park Zoo. Just like with other zoos I’ve been to, I was most eager to visit the Great Ape exhibit. As always, after sitting and watching the chimpanzees for some time, I inevitably start to feel a bit guilty. There’s something about the chimps, with their eerily human-like behavior, that makes it feel wrong to be watching them in an enclosure.

You can get at the familiarity from a biological perspective by rattling off scientific facts like “they share 99% of our protein-coding genes,” or “our lineages split just 5-7 million years ago.” As a biological anthropologist, I am prone to do so. These things are often invoked to shed light on similarities between Homo sapiens and Pan troglodytes. Between species. Yet, even to someone who knows nothing of biology, there is still something about chimpanzees that rings familiar. Something about the way they behave, about the way they interact with other chimpanzees and their environment. You don’t need the biology or the genetics to begin to wonder if perhaps they should be considered as something more than animal. It’s clear they aren’t humans, but could they be individuals? Can a chimpanzee possess an understanding of a self, be a someone as opposed to a something; can they be “persons?”

When the concept of a person is brought up, many seem to begin by comparing the “other” to humans, using our species as a measuring stick. We take for granted that our species exemplifies what it is to be a person, to be an agent in the world. This leads many of us to assume that personhood is somehow intrinsically tied to human beings. It’s “a part of our DNA,” so to speak, to be a person. Thus, any other creature or entity that might be considered to be a “person” is measured against abilities that exist in Homo sapiens. This often tosses the question to scientists to figure out if the “other” is enough like us to be a person. When considering chimps and other apes, this has been the charge of cognitive and comparative psychologists.

For quite some time now, chimps and other primates have been subject to a battery of cognitive tests aimed at assessing theory of mind. One of the first major studies in this area was Gallup’s “mirror test.” In essence, an animal is sedated and a mark is placed on their forehead, where it could not be seen by any normal method. The animal awakens in front of a mirror with no knowledge of the dot. If they begin to use the mirror to inspect themselves, in particular the dot, it suggests that the animal has some idea that the thing in the mirror is not just “that animal,” but is “me.” Thus, they would possess, at minimum, a sense of bodily awareness. The study has been replicated numerous times with various animals, but consistent passing has largely been restricted to adult species of Great Apes. Moreover, humans don’t start passing the test until around 18 months of age.

One of last cognitive bastions separating humans from other primates was the inability to show that other primates understand false beliefs. This might seem like an odd barrier, but understanding false beliefs, or the intentions of others, is an important and potentially testable component of understanding the mind of others. However, a recent study published in Science has purportedly demonstrated that chimps – as well as orangutans and bonobos – can in fact understand the false beliefs of others. Through the use of eye tracking software, all three primates were shown to anticipate another ape’s (okay, really a human dressed as an ape) false belief by looking where the misinformed ape would look before they did, even though the observing primates knew the object wasn’t in that location. If replicated and demonstrated to be a reliable finding, there will indeed be little in terms of testable self-consciousness that we possess that at least some apes do not.

Still, with chimpanzees passing a battery of cognitive tests over the years, many people, including some scientists, would not consider them a person. But where does the jump from a “highly intelligent animal” to a “person” happen? It seems the science is being backed into an increasingly small corner. As we get better at testing cognitive concepts that were once thought to be solely human, we are finding that other animals are more similar to us in more ways than we had previously imagined. We are coming to a point where cognitive tests won’t tell us much new information about basic cognitive processes. Sure, specifics will be discovered and outlined, and will no doubt lead to some interesting conclusions. But as it pertains to personhood, it’s doubtful that we will get many more perspective-changing findings.

Comparison to human persons is perhaps not the best way to approach the question of personhood. It’s important, but it isn’t sufficient. Conditions for personhood need to be taken from the perspective of the organism in question. Sociocultural anthropologists are pretty much already trained to do something like this. In the same way that we employ the concept of cultural relativism to study human cultures, we should be taking chimpanzees and other apes on their own terms. The sciences have shown us that chimpanzees possess highly developed cognitive and emotional abilities and complex social structures. It’s time primatologists and psychologists invite sociocultural anthropologists – and sociocultural anthropologists accept the invitation – to the table to work together to understand what it means for something other than a human, such as a chimp, to be a person. The person only exists in the context of the social, so there needs to be discussion with experts on the social.

If chimps or other apes are to gain personhood, it likely won’t be due to anything extra that they can do that we haven’t already seen. Personhood for chimps will finally be realized not through more cognitive tests or changes in evolutionary timelines, but through a reimagining of what it really means to be a person. These are questions that sciences such as biology and psychology can contribute to, but not answer alone. Indeed, thinking about what it means to be a person will see the most progress from dialogue between more humanistic disciplines, such as philosophy and sociocultural anthropology, and the life sciences. The life sciences do the important job of creating and carrying out the tests for the questions, but the experiments are only as insightful as the questions that are being asked. It seems that other disciplines may have a lot to contribute in the form of questions. Throughout the next three posts, I hope to provoke thoughts and discussion on what is means to be a person from a few different disciplines. The question not only has implications for how we perceive ourselves and other beings with whom we co-occupy the Earth, but also has legal implications in fields such as primatology, medicine, and artificial intelligence. These legal implications are already being played out in primatology and medicine, and will soon be the center of discussion around artificial intelligence.