Also, to this:

“civil, informative, and even-keeled”

I wouldn’t exactly call throwing terms like “asinine” around, even-keeled. It’s not exactly Bill O’Reilly caliber bias of course, but it’s still an ad-hominem criticism and not a refutation of the points of the article she disputes. We all do it from time to time, so I’m not trying to play holier-than-thou.

I’m not sayin’, I’m just sayin’.

As for the British empire analogy, if I may be so bold as to interpret what I take to be itsalljustaride’s point: yes, in the long term empires all come unglued due to their vulnerability to a variety of pressures. The effective difference between Britain and China is that the former is a democracy based on assertively universal liberal values with which the Raj was plainly inconsistent. They were consequently vulnerable to the moral authority of popular movements. China is not; therefore, the effective pressure will most likely have to be different. Try to imagine the Roman Empire falling because of street protests in Dalmatia.

I’m a scholar of India, not of Tibet, and want to speak from that position. What I hear in the comments is that we can’t risk upsetting the Chinese government or the Chinese people. Are you serious, people? Remember a little thing called the British empire? The British empire thought it would exist forever, that the Indians couldn’t rule themselves, and that British rule in India thus was necessary. Sound familiar? Suggesting that Tibetans tone down their resistance because it might upset the Chinese or not be “effective” is myopic to say the least and anachronistic given the history of colonialism elsewhere. India was part of the British empire for over 200 years and has now been independent for over fifty. What lies ahead for Tibet is certainly not only going to be determined by politicians in Beijing but also by ordinary people, including ordinary Tibetans.

But enough about India.

I also want to publicly thank Carole McGranahan for opening this discussion here. There are only too many internet pundits out there, and so a scholar of Tibet willing at the moment to speak publicly on the situation as it unfolds is valuable to all of us. I also commend her for not returning the attacking tone of some of the posters here; she has repeatedly kept her posts civil, informative, and even-keeled. I know I would not have done the same were I her, so kudos to her.

I agree with you that the sentiment of the Chinese people matters. This is why I drew attention above to the petition thirty Chinese intellectuals submitted to the PRC government re: Tibet
(http://www.savetibet.org/news/newsitem.php?id=1245 ). As I see it, the voice of intellectuals here is an important starting point, especially in a country like China.

One other source I like is China Digital Times (http://chinadigitaltimes.net/) which has recently run posts/articles on:
—Chinese bloggers on Tibet
(http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2008/03/chinese-bloggers-on-tibet/)
—”Tibet: Her Pain, My Shame” by Chinese documentary filmmaker Tang Danhong

(http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2008/03/tibet-her-pain-my-shame/)
—”Nationalism and Misunderstanding in Tibet”
(http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2008/03/nationalism-and-misunderstanding-in-tibet/)

and much, much more.

I disagree with you, however, on what will or won’t work with the Chinese government or people. My understanding of history is that it can’t be predicted, and what one thinks will happen often doesn’t and vice versa (including in China, and including things that the PRC government hadn’t anticipated…like these protests). Tibetans inside and outside Tibet will protest or not irregardless of what anyone posting here thinks they should do. I believe its their right to assess the situation and make their own decisions about what to do.

I never read anything of his as giving direct blame for the uprisings in Tibet on Hollywood or the US. The point is that the strategy of internationalization, demonstrations, and other tactics that are commonly employed against democratic nations will not work against China because it isn’t a democracy. It is a top-down system and as such it isn’t particularly amenable to pressure from the bottom, especially by international groups like SFT.

Not only does it not work against the Chinese government, but it also polarizes the Chinese people DIRECTLY (i.e. without government prompting) against the Free Tibet supporters. When someone shouts “Free Tibet” they mean one of two things, either “freedom in Tibet” or “freedom from China”. Both are problematic for ordinary Chinese because, 1) demanding freedom IN Tibet ignores those in the rest of China who suffer equally (and in some cases more) under the CCP, and 2) demanding freedom FROM China simply does not jive with the nationalism that is swirling in China now, and never will. If they don’t even have the Chinese people on their side how ever would this issue be resolved?

http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/03/30/asia/china.php

But….might you be able to do some of this analysis for us? What sort of research do you do in Tibet? I’d be interested in reading your work, if you could share some of your articles with us here.

From my side, here are some thoughts:

Can we separate monks from the Tibetan populace? Yes and no. In some ways, monks (and nuns) willingly take on societal roles (not just spiritual ones), including speaking out, that ordinary Tibetans cannot. With no children or spouses, monks and nuns do not have the familial ties that would make their jailing and/or death a major hardship on a family. At the same time, however, family ties are also what part of what makes monks and nuns such a central component of the Tibetan social landscape. Monks and nuns are a part of everyone’s family; for those of you reading this who work in Tibet in some capacity or who are Tibetan, how many Tibetans can you think of who do not have a direct family member who is a monk or nun? I’m guessing not very many. For most Tibetans, monks and nuns are not as distant a group as it might sound to non-Tibetan ears. Regular Tibetans, monks, and nuns share social spaces: streets, markets, restaurants, as well as being present in the home: conducting rituals, visiting family, visiting friends and so on. I think that Charlene Makley’s work on this relations between monks/nuns and the lay population is worth looking at if you’re not already familiar with it.

Who were the protesters? I disagree that if it wasn’t monks, it was only urban male youth. The reports that I’m reading coming out of Tibet are more varied than that: men and women, old and young, and not just urban (although what does urban mean outside of Lhasa, anyway?). Nomads, peasants, townspeople all. And, yes, of course, each of these groups is diverse within itself. Not every nomad is riding a motorcycle to herd yak and to get into town for supplies. Want to get a good sense of some of the range of social groups in Tibet today? Emily Yeh has some excellent articles discussing just this, including a great piece on how nomads negotiate state policy and religious authority.

What about the monolithic Chinese state? Sure, there are ebbs and flows in Chinese policy in Tibet, as well as differences in the feel of government and actual policy in Tibetan areas throughout the TAR, Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan. But there are also incredible continuities in Chinese policy and sentiment on Tibet over time, as well as the building of specific beliefs over the last fifty years such that they appear to be natural and longstanding. Who to read on this? Tsering Shakya (both his book and his New Left Review dialogue with Wang Lixiong), Shirin Akiner and Robert Barnett’s edited volume on Reform and Resistance, or, if you read Chinese, the Tibetan intellectual (currently under house arrest in Beijing) Woeser’s blog (http://woeser.middle-way.net/ ).

I don’t have intellectual trouble acknowledging distinction, difference, divergence, etc. among a people, among government policy, among any social formation and yet at the same time also acknowledging that people have risen up against a government and many (hundreds it seems) have been killed for this. We’re not discussing a rise in the cost of electricity in Lhasa here, but uprisings, arrests, disappearances, and deaths.

And, yes, for the record, I do find the main point of Patrick French’s op-ed asinine (and I’m reading it in the context of his general work on Tibet which is much the same). To blame the Tibetans or Hollywood or the US Congress for the uprisings in Tibet not only denies agency to Tibetans but also cops-out on assigning any responsibility to China. Personally, I’m an equal opportunity critic. I’ve got critiques of the British, the Chinese, the Americans, and yes, even the Tibetan Government in Exile. And these aren’t blogosphere critiques, but published ones. Some of my relevant articles are the following:

“Empire Out-of-Bounds: Tibet in the Era of Decolonization,” in Ann Stoler, Carole McGranahan, and Peter C. Perdue, eds., Imperial Formations, Santa Fe: School of American Press, 2007, pp. 187-227.

“Tibet’s Cold War: The CIA and the Chushi Gangdrug Resistance, 1956-1974,”Journal of Cold War Studies 8(3), Summer 2006, pp. 102-130.

“Truth, Fear, and Lies: Exile Politics and Arrested Histories of the Tibetan Resistance,”Cultural Anthropology 20(4), November 2005, pp. 570-600.

History, complexity, critique, deconstructing homogeneity and hegemony; its all there. Right now, though, as arrests and protests continue in Tibet, I don’t think any of us are capable of the sort of analysis that we all wish we had or that we could do. And so while I am currently finishing my book on the Tibetan resistance army, my head—-and, yes, my heart—-are also tied up in what’s going on in Tibet and I see no need to apologize for that at all.

The TGIE is aware that Patrick French has a point that outside pressure by Free Tibet nationalists has adverse effects on negotiations:

http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=10581&t=1&c=1

The ever-anthropological question of settlement policies:

http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/china-anxious-to-prove-settled-life-is-better-for-tibetan-nomads/2005/10/04/1128191719598.html

Economics:

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/homepage/story/30651.html
http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=11797&article=A+Look+at+Quality+of+Life+in+Tibet&t=1&c=1

Three Han Chinese talk about life in Tibet:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4954926.stm

Essentially, yes, China’s economic investment in Tibet is leading to some new opportunities for some Tibetans, however, there are those who are being left behind. Tibet has always been one of the poorest regions in the area, and because of that are at a disadvantage to migrants from other areas of China, not all of them Han. Some come from areas near Tibet in different ethnic communities, but are still seen by Tibetans as “Chinese”.

Exile Tibetan’s claim that China has a specific policy of moving ethnic Han and other Chinese to Tibet to dilute the population, which I personally doubt, as the economic forces are quite enough on their own to drive migrants to the area.

The Tibetans who are capitalizing on the new situation of economic investment are the ones who are not particularly fervent about Tibetan nationalism. The monks and the economically disadvantaged are the ones who resent the Chinese presence for reasons which range from restrictions on religious practice (largely related to political priorities) to claims that Tibetans can’t compete with the Han Chinese migrants economically.

The Chinese who aren’t especially happy about being in Tibet are those who only come for a year or so (the Han Chinese population in Tibet is largely transitory, they come for a few years, make their money, then go home). They don’t particularly love being in Tibet, but come for the opportunity to capitalize on the growing economy.

I was otherwise engaged at the moment, but I’m working on compiling a list of articles I’ve collected over the past couple years that address the questions that were raised in the comments.

”(Tibetan protesters are politically heterogeneous??!!—OMG, insight)”

The problem is that that isn’t exactly a sarcastic comment in this topic. Many people DO assume that Tibetans protestors are a politically heterogenous bunch. Maybe not here precisely, but in most circles where the topic is discussed, yes, it is a common belief.

I guess it’s standard anthropological practice to raise a bunch of “deep questions” that “complexify” things. But guys, it was a blog post. Maybe your energy might be better spent actually addressing some of these “deep questions” than devoting most of your responses to criticizing someone for not unpacking the complex history underlying the recent violence in Tibet… in a single blog post.

What I’m saying is that McGranahan’s post was somewhat informative, if impassioned on the subject of victims of state violence. Your “critical responses” (Tibetan protesters are politically heterogeneous??!!—OMG, insight) were so much typical academic hand waving that did nothing to help make sense of the situation.

The State of Anthropological Discourse on Unrest in Tibet: A Play in One Act
Carlos Mondragon: “I really think that those of us involved in the study of contemporary Tibet have to try – despite whatever moral outrage we may feel at ongoing injustices – to bring a little more analysis and a little less passion to the debate.”
itsalljustaride: “Wow, thanks for that Carlos. I was beginning to think this might have become a wasted opportunity here.”
Tibetan protester: [attempts to respond but gurgles a little and then dies from massive head injury caused by police baton]

(All that said, I honestly did enjoy reading your blog, Carlos.)

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/22/opinion/22french.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Patrick+French&st=nyt&oref=slogin

For the uninitiated, Patrick French is the former director of the Free Tibet campaign in London. He wrote a book a few years ago called Tibet, Tibet that was somewhat critical of the Tibetan strategy of internationalizing the issue, and also suggested that from a pragmatic standpoint, there will probably be no Free Tibet without a Free China. A statement which understandably galls the nationalist sentiment of many exile Tibetans.